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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

MARIA MACKELPRANG,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	Case No. 2:06-cv-00788- JCM-GWF
)	
vs.)	<u>ORDER</u>
)	
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE AGENCY)	
OF NEVADA, INC., et al.,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Fidelity National Title Agency of Nevada, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Consent Letter From Plaintiff (#38), filed November 27, 2006; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Fidelity National Title Agency of Nevada, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Consent Letter from Plaintiff (#49), filed on December 15, 2006; and Defendant Fidelity National Title Agency of Nevada, Inc.’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Fidelity’s Motion to Compel Consent Letter from Plaintiff (#60), filed on December 29, 2006. The Court conducted a hearing on this matter on January 4, 2007.

BACKGROUND

This case involves claims by Plaintiff against Defendants for sexual harassment based on gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and in violation of Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) § 613.330, constructive discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, battery, assault, and negligent retention, supervision and training.
...

1 In her Complaint (#1) filed on June 29, 2006, Plaintiff alleges that she was an employee of
2 Defendant Fidelity National Title Agency of Nevada, Inc. ("Fidelity"). Plaintiff alleges that beginning
3 in or about February 2004, Defendant Brian Bowers ("Bowers"), a vice-president of Fidelity, began
4 sending her inappropriate and sexually explicit emails on her office computer on at least a weekly basis.
5 After Plaintiff's husband became employed by Fidelity in April 2004, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Peter
6 Dunlap ("Dunlap"), another Fidelity vice-president, coerced Plaintiff into having sexual relations with
7 him under the threat that if she did not do so, her husband would be fired. Plaintiff alleges that she
8 submitted to Dunlap's unwanted sexual acts out of fear that she and her husband would lose their jobs.
9 Plaintiff alleges that Dunlap also began making inappropriate and sexually explicit remarks to Plaintiff
10 in the office on a regular basis, and that Bowers began increasing his inappropriate and sexually explicit
11 emails and remarks to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that over the next several months Dunlap continued to
12 coerce her into submitting to numerous sexual acts in and outside the Fidelity office.

13 Plaintiff alleges that in October 2004, she complained to a female vice-president of Fidelity
14 about the sexual harassment but no action was taken, and Bowers and Dunlap continued to engage in
15 their wrongful conduct. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff's husband was terminated from his
16 employment on January 3, 2005. On that same date, Plaintiff allegedly complained about the sexual
17 harassment to Fidelity's vice-president of human resources. She alleges that the vice-president of
18 human resources promised to take care of the situation, but also told Plaintiff that if she brought up the
19 subject again she would be fired. Plaintiff alleges that on January 6, 2005, she attempted to commit
20 suicide in the workplace. Plaintiff alleges that following her suicide attempt, she was placed in a
21 mental health facility and thereafter was on a period of short term disability. She alleges that she
22 attempted to obtain assurances from Fidelity that if she returned to work, the sexual harassment would
23 cease. Fidelity allegedly failed to respond to her requests, and Plaintiff therefore considered herself to
24 be constructively discharged from employment. Plaintiff alleges that since leaving Fidelity's
25 employment, she had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder,
26 and panic disorder stemming from the intolerable and discriminatory work environment she was
27 subjected to at Fidelity. Plaintiff alleges that as a direct result of Defendant's wrongful conduct, she
28 attempted suicide again in late January 2005 and again in March 2006, requiring her to be submitted to

1 a mental health facility on both occasions.

2 Defendant Fidelity's instant Motion to Compel (#38) concerns Defendant's efforts to obtain
3 email communications on two Myspace.com internet accounts allegedly set up by Plaintiff. Plaintiff
4 has not admitted that these Myspace.com accounts are, in fact, accounts she established or on which she
5 has communicated with other persons. Defendant's Motion, however, presents sufficient evidence that
6 these accounts belong to the Plaintiff. According to the affidavit of Defendant's counsel, she
7 discovered the existence of these accounts in or about August 2006, and Defendant Fidelity thereafter
8 served a subpoena on Myspace.com on September 26, 2006 to produce all records for these accounts,
9 including private email communications exchanged between Plaintiff and others. In response to the
10 subpoena, Myspace.com produced certain "public" information regarding the two accounts, but refused
11 to produce private email messages on either account in the absence of a search warrant or a letter of
12 consent to production by the owner of the account.

13 In one of the Myspace.com accounts, Plaintiff allegedly identified herself as a 39 year old
14 single female and indicates that "I don't want kids." Records produced to Defendant by Myspace.com
15 indicate that this account was opened on November 6, 2005 and that this account was last logged-into
16 on December 16, 2005. There was no log-in activity on this account in 2006. Whether there were other
17 log-ins to this account between November 6, 2005 and the last log-in on December 16, 2005 is
18 unknown. The other Myspace.com account allegedly identifies Plaintiff as a 39 year old married female
19 with six children and states that Plaintiff loves all her children. The records produced by Myspace.com
20 indicate that this account was opened on April 30, 2006 and that this account was last logged-into on
21 June 17, 2006. The records produced by Myspace.com indicate that there were a total of seven (7) log-
22 ins to this account between April 30 and June 17, 2006.

23 On September 29, 2006, Defendant's counsel sent a letter and "Consent and Authorization For
24 Private Messages" to Plaintiff's counsel requesting that Plaintiff execute the consent for Defendants to
25 obtain the private messages on the two Myspace.com accounts. Plaintiff refused to provide the consent
26 for release of the private messages on the grounds that the information sought by Defendant is
27 irrelevant and improperly invades Plaintiff's privacy. In its Motion to Compel (#38), Defendant states
28 that it will stipulate that any private message records produced by Myspace.com pursuant to the

1 consent/authorization will be subject to the stipulated protective order previously entered in this case to
2 protect the privacy interests of the parties and prevent disclosure of information to third persons who
3 have no involvement in this litigation.

4 **DISCUSSION**

5 Assuming that the two Myspace.com accounts are Plaintiff's accounts, and the evidence
6 suggests they are, Defendant has no information regarding the identities of the persons with whom
7 Plaintiff has exchanged email messages or what the subject matter or content of those email messages
8 are. Defendant raises a number of issues, however, regarding the type of information that might be
9 contained in the messages that would be relevant to the issues in this case. Plaintiff contends that
10 Defendant is simply engaging in a "fishing expedition" and has no relevant basis for discovering the
11 private messages on either account. The Court agrees that Defendant is engaging in a fishing
12 expedition since, at this time, it has nothing more than suspicion or speculation as to what information
13 might be contained in the private messages. The Court will separately address the allegations raised by
14 Defendant for seeking production of the private messages.

15 **1. Allegation that Private Messages May Contain Evidence that Plaintiff Engaged in**
16 **Consensual Sexually Related Email Communications With Other Persons on**
17 **Myspace.com.**

18 Defendant points to the unusual circumstance that Plaintiff opened a Myspace.com account in
19 November 2005 which identifies herself as a single 39 year old female who does not want to have kids,
20 and that Plaintiff subsequently opened a second Myspace.com account in April 2006 which identifies
21 herself as a married woman with six children whom she loves. In support of its Motion, Defendant
22 argues that Plaintiff was a willing participant who condoned and actively encouraged the alleged sexual
23 communications with Bowers and Dunlap, and the alleged sexual conduct with Dunlap, and that none
24 of the complained-of conduct actually offended Plaintiff. Defendant then states:

25 Fidelity believes that Mackelprang was using the private messaging
26 functionality on Myspace to facilitate the same types of electronic and
27 physical relationships she has characterized as sexual harassment in her
28 Complaint. If in fact Mackelprang was voluntarily pursuing, encouraging
or even engaging in extra-marital relationships on or through Myspace,
then Fidelity has a right to use this information to rebut Mackelprang's
sexual harassment claims and impeach her credibility.

28 *Defendant's Motion to Compel* (#38), pages 7-8.

1 Defendant also argues that such evidence, if discovered in the private emails, is relevant to
2 whether Plaintiff, in fact, suffered emotional distress damages as a result of Bowers' and Dunlap's
3 alleged sexual misconduct.

4 The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have held that workplace-related sexual behavior
5 by a plaintiff may be admissible to support a defense in a sexual harassment action that defendant's
6 conduct was not unwelcomed or that defendant had reasonable grounds to believe it was not
7 unwelcomed by the plaintiff. In *Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson*, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69, 106 S.Ct. 2399,
8 2406-07 (1986), the Court stated that the plaintiff's sexually provocative speech or dress in the
9 workplace is relevant to the issue of whether she found particular sexual advances unwelcome. Such
10 evidence may be admissible in a sexual harassment lawsuit where the trier of fact is required to
11 determine the existence of sexual harassment in light of the record as a whole and the totality of the
12 circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
13 occurred. The Court noted that the district court must carefully weigh the applicable considerations of
14 whether the relevance of the information is outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, but stated
15 that such evidence is not *per se* inadmissible.

16 Fed. R. Evid. 412(a), which was amended after *Meritor Sav. Bank, supra*, generally provides
17 that evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior or to prove the
18 alleged victim's sexual predisposition is inadmissible in any civil proceeding involving alleged sexual
19 misconduct, except as provide in subsection (c)(2).

20 Rule 412(c)(2) states as follows:

21 In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual
22 predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these rules
23 and outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of the
24 alleged victim's reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim.

25 The Advisory Committee Notes state that the rule aims to safeguard the alleged victim against
26 the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public
27 disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact finding process.
28 By affording victims protection in most instances, the rule also encourages victims of sexual
misconduct to institute and participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders. The rule also

1 recognizes that there are also legitimate and admissible grounds for introducing certain sexual conduct
2 evidence and requires the court to balance the competing interests. In *B.K.B. v. Maui Police*
3 *Department*, 276 F.3d 1091,1105 (9th Cir. 2002), the court, in applying Rule 412 in a sexual
4 harassment lawsuit, held that the probative value of evidence of a plaintiff's sexual sophistication or
5 private sexual behavior outside the workplace, generally does not substantially outweigh the unfair
6 prejudice to plaintiff and therefore should not be admitted. The rule shifts the burden to the proponent
7 of the evidence to justify its admission. See *A.W. v. I.B. Corp.*, *supra*, 220 F.R.D. 20, 24 (D. Maine
8 2004).

9 Although Rule 412(c) governs the admissibility of evidence at trial and does not apply to
10 discovery of a victim's past sexual conduct or predisposition in civil cases, which continue to be
11 governed by Fed. R.Civ. P. 26, the Advisory Notes further state:

12 In order not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412, however, courts
13 should enter appropriate orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to
14 protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure
15 confidentiality. Courts should presumptively issue protective orders
16 barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery makes a showing
17 that the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant under the
18 facts and theories of the particular case and cannot be obtained except
19 through discovery. In an action for sexual harassment, for instance, while
20 some evidence of the alleged victim's sexual behavior and/or
21 predisposition in the workplace may perhaps be relevant, non-workplace
22 conduct will usually be irrelevant. *Cf. Burns v. McGregor Electronic*
23 *Industries, Inc.*, 989 F.2d 959, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1993) (posing for a nude
24 magazine outside work hours is irrelevant to the issue of unwelcomeness
25 of sexual advances at work). Confidentiality orders should be
26 presumptively granted as well.

27 In *Mitchell v. Hutchings*, 116 F.R.D. 481 (D. Utah 1987), the defendants sought to depose
28 persons who had personal (i.e., sexual) relationships with the plaintiffs and a photographer who
allegedly took sexually suggestive pictures of one or more of the plaintiffs which were displayed at the
police station where plaintiffs and the defendants were employed. Defendants argued that this
discovery was relevant to whether the defendants' alleged sexual conduct was offensive and whether
plaintiffs suffered emotional distress as result of the defendants' conduct. Applying *Meritor Sav. Bank*,
supra, the court held that evidence relating to plaintiffs' sexual conduct or behavior in the work
environment was obviously relevant if such conduct was known to the defendants. The court, therefore,
held that defendants were entitled to depose the photographer, but only in regard to photographs which

1 were publicly displayed in the police station or which were shown to the defendants. The court also
2 held that defendants were entitled to depose a co-employee with whom plaintiffs engaged in sexual
3 conduct at the workplace. The court held, however, that evidence regarding plaintiffs' sexual conduct
4 outside the workplace with persons who were not fellow employees, and which were unknown to
5 defendants, was irrelevant to their affirmative defense that the sexual conduct was welcomed by
6 plaintiffs.

7 *Mitchell* also held that evidence concerning plaintiffs' sexual conduct outside the workplace
8 with non employees was not relevant to the issue of their damages for emotional distress. In this
9 regard, the court stated:

10 Defendants argue that those damages require an inquiry into the sexual
11 behavior of the plaintiffs because sexually promiscuous people are less
12 likely to be offended by sexual harassment, and thus less damaged.
13 Although defendant's argument has a persuasive ring, this court does not
14 agree. Past sexual conduct does not, as defendants would argue, create
15 emotional calluses that lessen the impact of unwelcomed sexual
16 harassment. The fact that the plaintiffs may welcome sexual advances
17 from certain individuals has absolutely no bearing on the emotional
18 trauma they may feel from sexual harassment that is unwelcome. Past
19 sexual conduct does not callous one to subsequent, unwelcomed sexual
20 advancements. This court cannot condone a wholesale inquiry into the
21 past sexual conduct of the plaintiffs under such a theory.

22 116 F.R.D. at 485.

23 Other courts have similarly refused to allow such discovery under the principles set forth in
24 Fed.R.Evid. 412. In *Barta v. City & County of Honolulu*, 169 F.R.D. 132, 136 (D. Haw. 1996), the
25 court held that defendants were not entitled to inquire into plaintiff's sexual conduct while she was off-
26 duty, outside the workplace, and which did not involve conduct with the defendants. The court stated
27 that plaintiff's "sexual conduct in that defined area, remote in time and/or kind from her claims, has no
28 relevance to her claims or applicable defenses." In *A.W. v. I.B. Corp.*, 224 F.R.D. 20 (D. Maine 2004),
the plaintiff alleged that he was sexually harassed by another male employee who engaged in
unwelcomed sexual conduct and physical contact with plaintiff of a sexual nature. At deposition,
defendant's counsel sought to question plaintiff about his homosexual conduct, including whether he
had multiple sexual partners, engaged in sexual acts in parks or other public places, and whether
defendant's allegedly offensive conduct was different from other sexual conduct that plaintiff

1 consensually engaged in with other men. In regard to the issue of defendant's liability for sexual
2 harassment, the court held that these questions were precisely of the types of intrusive generalized
3 questions about past, private, consensual sexual conduct that courts readily have found marginally, if at
4 all, relevant to sexual harassment claims. *Id.* 220 F.R.D. at 26.

5 By contrast in *Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co.*, 142 F.R.D. 311 (S.D. Iowa 1992), the plaintiff alleged
6 that he was wrongfully terminated based on false charges of sexual harassment which the defendant
7 employer failed to properly investigate. Plaintiff sought to depose the alleged victim of the harassment
8 regarding her sexual conduct in the workplace. The court held that the discovery relating to whether an
9 alleged victim engaged in sexual conduct with other employees of which the plaintiff had preexisting
10 knowledge was potentially admissible and therefore discoverable. In *Gibbons v. Food Lion*, 1999 WL
11 3326474 (M.D. Flor. 1999), the court also held that the defendant was entitled to obtain discovery
12 whether plaintiff had engaged in sexual relations with other employees outside the workplace.

13 The alleged sexual harassment in this case occurred in 2004. Plaintiff did not return to work at
14 Fidelity after her alleged January 6, 2005 suicide attempt. Defendant has, at most, raised a suspicion
15 that Plaintiff may have subsequently engaged in sexually related email communications on the
16 Myspace.com internet account in which she lists herself as a single woman with no children. The
17 Myspace.com accounts were opened several months after Plaintiff left Defendant's employment.
18 Assuming that the Myspace.com account contains sexually related email messages exchanged between
19 Plaintiff and others, such evidence would not be admissible to support Defendants' defense that their
20 prior alleged sexual conduct was welcomed by Plaintiff. The courts applying Rule 412 have declined to
21 recognize a sufficiently relevant connection between a plaintiff's non-work related sexual activity and
22 the allegation that he or she was subjected to unwelcome and offensive sexual advancements in the
23 workplace.

24 In regard to Plaintiff's emotional distress damages, the facts here are potentially distinguishable
25 from those in *Mitchell v. Hutchings* or *Barta v. City & County of Honolulu* because Plaintiff's possibly
26 sexually related communications on the Myspace.com account occurred *after* Defendants' alleged
27 sexual harassment. Evidence that Plaintiff has subsequently engaged in sexually related email
28 communications with other persons may arguably be more relevant to whether Plaintiff suffered

1 emotional distress damages than would evidence of Plaintiff's sexual behavior before the alleged
2 harassment. Notwithstanding this distinction, the Court finds that the probative value of such evidence
3 does not substantially outweigh its unfair prejudicial effect to Plaintiff. Again, the courts have
4 generally drawn the line on permissible discovery in this area by permitting discovery of the plaintiff's
5 work-related sexual conduct, but not permitting inquiry into plaintiff's private sexual conduct. This
6 distinction is based, in part, on the conclusion that what a person views as acceptable or welcomed
7 sexual activity or solicitation in his or her private life, may not be acceptable or welcomed from a
8 fellow employee or a supervisor. Thus, while the plaintiff's non-work related sexual conduct or
9 behavior may be relevant to some degree in regard to whether she suffered emotional distress damages,
10 its probative value as to either liability or damages is not substantial enough to outweigh the unfair
11 prejudice that its admission would cause.¹

12 The Court, therefore, concludes that Defendants have failed to demonstrate a relevant basis for
13 obtaining production of Plaintiff's Myspace.com private email messages based on Defendants'
14 suspicion that they may contain sexually explicit or sexually promiscuous content.

15 **2. Defendant's Other Grounds for Seeking Production of the Private Email**
16 **Communications.**

17 Defendant also argues that it is entitled to obtain production of the Myspace.com private email
18 communications because they may contain statements made by Plaintiff and witnesses about the subject
19 matter of this case which could presumably constitute admissions by Plaintiff or which could
20 potentially be used to impeach the witnesses' testimony. In addition, Defendant argues that the private
21 email messages may contain information that Plaintiff's alleged severe emotional distress was caused
22 by factors other than Defendant's alleged sexual harassment misconduct. Defendant notes that
23 Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendant Dunlap was aware in April 2004 that Plaintiff was severely
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25 ¹There is no evidence or reason to believe that the Myspace.com accounts contain sexually
26 related email communications between Plaintiff and former co-employees of Fidelity. Such conduct, if
27 it occurred, would also have taken place after Plaintiff was no longer employed by Defendant. If
28 Defendants develops some basis, beyond mere speculation, to support a reasonable belief that Plaintiff
engaged in sexually email communications on her Myspace.com accounts with former co-employees at
Fidelity, the Court might have reason to reconsider Defendant's motion to compel on that ground.

1 distressed about a child custody issue relating to her children and was on depression medication.
2 Defendants also argue that the web page of a Myspace.com account belonging to Plaintiff's son
3 indicates that he moved from Las Vegas to Pennsylvania because of a rift that had grown between
4 himself and Plaintiff. Finally, as set forth in her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she attempted to again
5 commit suicide in March 2006, which she alleges was a direct result of the wrongful acts of the
6 Defendants. Defendant suggests that Plaintiff's subsequent private email messages could contain
7 information relevant to this suicide attempt.

8 Ordering Plaintiff to execute the consent and authorization form for release of all of the private
9 email messages on Plaintiff's Myspace.com internet accounts would allow Defendants to cast too wide
10 a net for any information that might be relevant and discoverable. It would, of course, permit
11 Defendants to also obtain irrelevant information, including possibly sexually explicit or sexually
12 promiscuous email communications between Plaintiff and third persons, which are not relevant,
13 admissible or discoverable.

14 The Court agrees with the position taken by the court in *Rozell v. Ross Holst*, 2006 WL 163143
15 (S.D.N.Y.), in regard to a similar request for production of plaintiff's private email communications. In
16 that case, plaintiff alleged that her supervisor made unwelcome sexual comments and touched her
17 provocatively against her will. After plaintiff complained to the company, the supervisor retaliated and
18 ultimately terminated plaintiff's employment. Thereafter, when plaintiff's attorney complained to
19 defendant by letter, the supervisor allegedly hacked into plaintiff's email account which she used for
20 work and personal matters and intercepted approximately 400 of her emails. The court held that
21 plaintiff was required to produce the contents of all of the emails she alleged were wrongfully
22 intercepted because the contents were relevant and potentially admissible to assess plaintiff's damages
23 under her statutory claim for wrongful interception of electronic communications. The court, however,
24 rejected defendant's argument that it was also entitled to production of all of the non-intercepted emails
25 because they were relevant to plaintiff's sexual harassment claim. The court noted that "defendants
26 speculate that 'Plaintiff may have communicated facts or contemporaneous impressions regarding her
27 working environment during the relevant time period to friends, relatives or other third parties via
28 email.'" *Rozell*, at page 3. Plaintiff's counsel had represented in their discovery responses, however,

1 that they had produced all email communications related to plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment.

2 The court stated:

3 If such documents exist, then the defendants have received them. If not,
4 then the defendants are indeed entitled to argue that the absence of such
documentation casts doubt on the plaintiff's claims. *Id.*

5 In denying plaintiff's motion to compel, the court commented that anything a person says or
6 does might in some theoretical sense be reflective of her emotional state, but that is hardly justification
7 for requiring production of every thought she may have reduced to writing or, indeed, the depositions of
8 everyone she may have talked to. The court further stated that it was the obligation of plaintiff and her
9 counsel, in responding to defendants' request for production of relevant email communications to
10 identify and produce those that were relevant to the lawsuit. In denying defendant's motion to compel
11 production of all non-intercepted emails, the court in *Rozell* stated:

12 The defendants are correct that an interested party cannot be the "final
13 arbiter" of relevance. But counsel for the producing party is the judge of
14 relevance in the first interest. Discovery in our adversarial system is
15 based on a good faith response to demands for production by an attorney
16 constrained by the Federal Rules and by ethical obligations. Where the
17 parties disagree as to the contours of relevance in connection with
particular discovery demands, they present their dispute to the court, as
the parties have done here. When a party can demonstrate that an
adversary may be wrongfully withholding relevant information, it can
seek relief; in this case the defendants have made no such showing.

18 *Rozell* also denied defendant's request that the court conduct an *in camera* review of the non-
19 intercepted emails to identify those which are relevant and should be produced. The court noted that *in*
20 *camera* review is ordinarily used when necessary to resolve disputes regarding privilege and is rarely
21 used to determine relevance. Although the number of emails at issue in this case do not appear to be
22 substantial, the Court agrees with *Rozell* that no basis exists for this Court to conduct an *in camera*
23 review of the Myspace.com private messages to determine if they contain relevant and discoverable
24 information. Nor has any party requested that the Court conduct such an *in camera* review.

25 Defendants are entitled to discover information relevant to Plaintiff's alleged emotional distress
26 and her mental condition, which she has placed at issue in this case. In her Complaint, ¶ 52, Plaintiff
27 alleges that she again attempted to commit suicide in March 2006 which she claims was a direct result
28 of Defendants' wrongful act. The information produced by Myspace.com for the account in which

1 Plaintiff lists herself as a married woman with six children indicates that there were seven log-ins to
2 that account between April 30th and June 17, 2006. It is, therefore, possible that Plaintiff might have
3 made discoverable statements in these email messages regarding her relatively recent March 2006
4 suicide attempt or the causes of her past or contemporaneous emotional distress which would be
5 relevant to assessing the credibility of her emotional distress claims. Certainly, if such information
6 exists in the email messages, Defendant is entitled to obtain its production.

7 The proper method for obtaining such information, however, is to serve upon Plaintiff properly
8 limited requests for production of *relevant* email communications. Nothing in this Order prevents
9 Defendants from serving such discovery requests on Plaintiff to produce her Myspace.com private
10 messages that contain information regarding her sexual harassment allegations in this lawsuit or which
11 discuss her alleged emotional distress and the cause(s) thereof. This, however, does not include private
12 email messages between Plaintiff and third persons regarding allegedly sexually explicit or
13 promiscuous emails not related to Plaintiff's employment with Fidelity. Moreover, nothing in this
14 Order prevents Defendant from conducting appropriate discovery to determine whether the
15 Myspace.com accounts do, in fact, belong to Plaintiff. The Court notes that a refusal by Plaintiff to
16 produce relevant and discoverable email communications based on a wrongful and bad faith denial that
17 the Myspace.com accounts belong to her could be grounds for imposing sanctions. Accordingly,

18 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Defendant's Motion to Compel Consent Letter From Plaintiff
19 (#38) is **denied**, without prejudice to Defendant's right to pursue discovery of relevant and discoverable
20 private email communications through other proper methods.

21 DATED this 9th day of January, 2007.

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25 _____
26 GEORGE FOLEY, JR.
27 U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
28